Transfer Of Power Agreement India 1947 Pdf

Members of both sides of each legislature, who met separately,37 are authorized to vote on whether or not to distribute the province. If a simple majority of both parties opts for division, there is division and appropriate arrangements are made. This last week of British rule in India was the most turbulent of all. We have worked longer and in more difficult conditions, and with crises of different magnitudes that occur every day and sometimes two or three times a day. The problem of states has occupied me most of the time, especially the leaders who have changed their minds until the last moment, whether they join India, Pakistan or neither. I made my farewell visit to Karachi and participated in incredible scenes on the day of the handover of power in Delhi. The theme behind the largest and most serious crisis to date has been the Border Commissions Award, a summary of which is contained in Annex I. 25 Author`s private papers and Moore, India in 1947, which deals with Mountbatten files 41 and 213; R/3/1/152, which also contains a note on the 57th Staff Meeting of the Viceroy on 5 August — the only one in which I participated — in which the document was discussed. Mountbatten wanted two issues that were not addressed in the document to be taken into account: common nationality and the possibility of a Commonwealth conference in Delhi (which Nehru could be introduced if he came to London in November to attend the royal wedding).

He also ordered that my diary be sent to Monckton for his comments. 13 The conflict between congress and the Political Department was very long. Everyone interpreted the 1946 memorandum as perceived in their own interest: for Corfield, when paramountcy was obsolete, the states were in favour of their independence, from which they could, but only if they wanted to, enter into free negotiations with a view to a “political agreement” with the Indian government; For Nehru, the independence of the states and the disruption of the country as “backdoor anarchy” and therefore impossible, the option of not having a “political agreement” was not open. The logic of some led to the proposal that States should remain free to establish contacts as they wished – with the Constituent Assembly, if they wished integration into the Union, with individual government departments of administrative relations and with the Department of Foreign Affairs if they wanted to be independent States (Corfield`s long memo of 27 March 1947, R/3/1/136). The logic of the other led to the creation of a new Ministry of State which, through the agreement to adhere to the three themes, would guarantee the conclusion of all the options for division (Nehru in Viceroy, 26 May, R/3/1/136 and 4 June, R/3/1/137). The India office oscillated between a number of points somewhere in between. Corfield`s efforts and some resistance in the office are well shown in L/P/S/13/1831. An important turning point in the struggle for the viceroy`s support was the Viceroy`s 18th Miscellaneou meeting on June 13 (R/3/1/137), when Nehru Corfield tried for “misdemeanour” and called for an immediate high-level judicial investigation. It was decided to create a Ministry of State. The negotiations of this ministry with the States are mentioned in R/1/30/39 and R/1/30/40 and are the subject of menon`s book (Integration of Indian States). .

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